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Faculty and Deans

Responses

THOMAS G. l<RATIENMAKER"

The editors have kindly given me time and space to reply to the
commenters. 1 For the most part, I have confined my responses to the
papers individually, rather than attempting to discuss them collectively.
Accordingly, I say a few words about each paper below. I take them
up alphabetically, by the last name of the first author.2 Before that,
however, I want to say two general things about these papers.
First, I am truly overwhelmed and gratified by them. That each of
these authors, every one a distinguished professional in her/his own
right, took the time and care to study and comment upon my article is
one of the finest acts of generosity I have ever received, an act for
which I feel quite undeserving. I am very grateful to every contributor
to this symposium for suggesting that I might have written something
worth reading.
Second, so did they! I think these papers, as a whole, greatly expand and enrich the piece I wrote. All the papers together paint a more
deeply textured picture of the 1996 Act than any one, including mine,
standing alone. I wish I could incorporate them all by reference.
To get the full story on universal service, one must read not only
my paper but Professor Campbell's comment as well. Professor Levi
provides the detail I missed on content regulation and licensing issues.
Messrs. Rosario and Kohler explain, as I did not, how state law will be
affected by the new Act. Professor Robinson illuminates virtually everything I discuss; here, I note specifically how he puts flesh on my review of _the provisions of the Act that unshackled local exchange carri-

• Dean and Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law.
1. Not unreasonably, the editors did impose time deadlines on me. Consequently, my comments respond, in some cases, to not-quite-final drafts. I apologize to nny commenters whose

revisions went unnoticed.
2. Except that Professor Hazlett's comment is discussed at the end.
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ers, freeing them to enter allied fields, such as long distance telephony
and cable television. Professor Spitzer adds substantially to my treatment of the motivation for, or momentum behind, the Act. Henry
Geller puts in perspective one central issue-discipline by markets versus discipline by regulators-while Professor Becker highlights another
key question-the aspirations we have for the beneficial deployment of
telecommunications technologies.
To all the commenters, then, thank you. Thank you for your care.
Thank you for improving "our'' product .... OK, enough! No more
Mr. Nice Guy! Here's what I really think:
Becker

Professor Becker quite rightly reminds us that we need to confront
clearly the underlying factual assumptions and value choices that animate our criticisms of regulation and of markets. He and I agree that
regulation is not a good thing in and of itself.
After that, we appear to part company. Professor Becker's complaint notwithstanding, I have indeed provided a rather extensive description of the kind of regulation and the kind of telecommunications
system I advocate. This required an entire book, Regulating Broadcast
Programming, which I co-authored with Professor Lucas Powe. I believe readers of that book will find in there a complete description and
defense-of course, not necessarily persuasive to all-of the regulatory
regime and telecommunications system I would welcome. In the present
article, I was constrained by page limitations to settle for a summary of
the book's conclusions, the four principles that Professor Becker notes
in his critique. To the charge of ignoring to lay out the premises, I
plead not guilty. Brevity-perhaps undue brevity-! concede.
Note, however, that what I did is still more than what Professor
Becker does. Where are his fact and value assumptions? Anyone can
describe things on television they do not like. What is Professor
Becker's plan for improving the situation? Surely, it cannot be more
government content regulation of broadcasting. We had lots of that in
the 1950s. Does Professor Becker think the broadcast industry was
more effective in educating and uplifting us in the 1950s than it is
now?3 Does he think that more regulation can get broadcasters to put

3. If he is, he should read Chapter 11 ofTHOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
dispels the myth that there once was a Golden

REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994) which
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on Mario Cuomo every time they air Rush Limbaugh't He is too smart
for that.
It is easy to talk (or write) about how we live in an imperfect
world. I thought we all knew that before we turned on the word processor. My paper addresses the questions of how we might make the
world of telecommunication a little bit better and whether the new Act
helps or hurts in that regard.
What is Professor Becker's answer to those questions? As far as I
can tell, he believes telecommunication would be better if it produced
more entertainment that entertained him and more information-such as
how to deal with the welfare bureaucracy or to dodge bullets on the
way to school-that Professor Becker thinks people other than he ought
to want. These, he seems to believe, we can achieve by more regulation (perhaps even if he is not the regulator).
The reason we need regulation, according to Professor Becker, is
that "telecommunications today . . . is already perhaps the chief
mechanism through which our society informs itself about the world
around it, and carries on the discussion and debate essential to a properly functioning democratic society."5 For those who do not have the
time to plow through Professor Powe's and my book, I suggest this
easier test of Becker's thesis: Newspapers in the period 1870-1930
appear to fit his definition of telecommunications today. Do you agree
with Professor Becker that extensive federal regulation of the content of
newspapers in that period would have improved our moral, spiritual,
financial, or intellectual well being? Would our ancestors have been
better off had they lived in a world in which people of the caliber of,
say, Interstate Commerce Commission commissioners ruled the media
of mass communications?
I am afraid that what I have said will sound as though I have some
personal animus toward Professor Becker. Quite the opposite is true. I
have the highest regard for his insights. What this response reflects is
rather my frustration at the willingness of even our most intelligent
analysts to call for regulation, without describing the regulation they
desire or how it will operate on real people, simply because they can

Age of Television.
4. If he does, he should read Chapter 9 of REGULATING BROADCAST PROGfW.t'tiNG, supra note
3, which dispels the myth that the FCC's "Fairness Doctrine" WllS a doctrine or that it had
anything to do with promoting fairness.
5. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Comments on "The Telecommunlcotions Act of 1996," by Thomas
G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L REv. 175, 176-77 (1996).
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describe a better world.
Let's talk, then, about implicit premises. At bottom, I submit, the
implicit assumption in Professor Becker's critique is that regulation will
make us better off because he will be the regulator. Yet, as he and we
know, people with Professor Becker's talents, energy and empathy are
rarely appointed to administrative agencies and have never been in the
majority of one for any time. Professor Becker's views-and mine-are
much more likely to be counted in the marketplace of ideas than in the
marketplace of regulatory politics so aptly described by Professor
Spitzer in his contribution. 6
Campbell

Professor Campbell's paper is a very valuable addition to this symposium. She provides a clear, comprehensive, and quite. fair description
of the universal service provisions of the new Act and their origins. As
I suggested in my principal paper, I believe that the universal service
aspects will prove to be some of the most important and most contentious features of the Act. Her road map to the universal service features
of the 1996 Act will prove very helpful to all of us, as the Jaw and
regulations in this area unfold.
Another advantage of Professor Campbell's paper is its contribution
to a study of the political economy of the Act. Her description of the
origins of the universal service provisions contains interesting illustrations of some of the points advanced by Professor Spitzer. Professor
Campbell shows how people-no matter how wealthy-who live in
rural areas are given special treatment principally because some senators
from states with large rural populations were strategically positioned to
affect the bill. 7 She also reveals that low income consumers were added
to the list of protected interests only at the last minute, virtually as an
afterthought. 8
Nevertheless, we may be sure that the universal service provisions
will be defended as a measure to alleviate the conditions of poverty.
6. Regarding universal service, I regret that my article did not make sufficiently clear that
I was complaining about the new Act's strategy of obtaining universal service through internal
cross-subsidies. As to universal service as a general policy, divorced from the issue of
achieving it by disrupting efficient low cost business arrangements, please see my response to
Professor Campbell.
7. Angelia J. Campbell, Universal Service Provisions: The "Ugly Duckling" of the /996
Act, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 187, 190-91(1996).
8. /d. at 191.
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Certainly, this is what both Professor Campbell and Professor Becker
do. In this regard, I fault Professor Campbell's paper for two omissions.
First, she does not tell us why we should tell low income people or
people who live in rural areas that they have a very strong need for
cheaper basic telecommunications services. Universal service is not free;
it does not grow on trees or float along in the air for us to pluck it. At
the moment, subsidized basic phone service is provided courtesy of
people who make long distance phone calls and who, while doing so,
pay inflated access charges to compensate local exchange carriers for
providing "universal service." Some of the people who make long distance phone calls live in rural areas or are low income consumers.
Why, they might ask Professor Campbell, have you decided to increase
our long distance bills in order to lower our basic connection charges?
Indeed, one might push the point somewhat farther. Why have we
decided--on behalf of Americans who live in rural areas, low income
consumers and high school principals-that what they need most is
cheap Internet access? What if they would rather have a cheap hot
breakfast every day? Or more disposable income? Universal service is
paid for with dollars collected by artificially keeping the prices of some
telecommunications services above their costs.9 Why should we not
choose to spend those dollars to subsidize hot meals for low income
consumers or high school students or (rich and poor) rural dwellers? In
truth, if these folks are so worthy-and I certainly agree that some of
them are-why don't we give them the dollars? Why do we know
better than low income consumers what are those consumers' most
compelling unfulfilled wants?
Professor Campbell's first omission, then, is to tell us why rich and
poor telecommunications service consumers should be taxed to provide
cheap telecommunications services to rich and poor telecommunications
service consumers. How do we know that this tax is a good strategy to
raise welfare dollars and that the dollars are being well spent?
Professor Campbell's second omission is her failure to explain what
the new Act's universal service features portend for the future of competition in telecommunications markets. In particular, other provisions
of the new Act seek to facilitate competition in local, wired telephony
markets by encouraging new firms to offer services by leasing necessary facilities from entrenched local exchange carriers. What is to pre-

9. Or more above their costs than they otherwise would be.
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vent the existing firms from convincing state regulators that every new
entrant must be directed either (a) to price above cost in order to support the universal service fund or, (b) if its services are sold to low
income or wealthy rural subscribers, to price below cost? Both pricing
patterns, of course, forestall entry, thus protecting incumbents.
Now, however, it is time for my concession speech. Whatever I
might think about employing a. system of internal cross-subsidies to
preserve cheap Internet access for vacationing skiers in Vail, Professor
Campbell's views about the utility of such an expanded universal service mechanism have won out. Congress voted her proposal up and
voted mine down. The second half of her paper provides an excellent
road map to the issues that arise in implementing the universal service
requirements, as well as an articulate defense of those requirements.
This part of Professor Campbell's paper will, I believe, be a major
contribution to the telecommunications literature for some time to come.
Geller

Henry Geller and I seem to agree on most of the particulars of the
new Act. Where he and I part company, it appears, is in the lessons
we take from the history that both of us have observed.
With me, Henry Geller agrees that the universal service provisions
of the Act are unfortunate. We think it is decent policy to extend telecommunications services to the poor, but see no reason to include people living on ranches or in ski resorts in the definition of "poor." Nor
do we believe that internal cross-subsidies are a useful mechanism to
expand telecommunications services.
With Professor Levi and me, Henry Geller believes that content
regulation of radio and television is a bad thing. He cannot understand,
nor can I, the desire to single out for censorship the broadcast method
of publication. He would not subject editors to the peril of guessing
how to comply with vague dictates.
With me, Henry Geller believes that our system of awarding licenses and parceling out the spectrum does not work well. He would go to
a system of auctions, with the high bidders allowed to use the spectrum
in a wide variety of ways.
What have I learned from these experiences? That we do not need
a Federal Communications Commission charged with micro-managing
the processes of competition in telecommunications. 10 What has Henry
10. As I point out in my principal paper, there might be other reasons to have a commis-
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Geller learned? Astonishingly to me, Henry Geller apparently has
learned from this history that it is good for Congress to cheer on the
FCC as it micro-manages competitive processes where the Commission
has not yet failed miserably.
Thus, Geller applauds what he describes as the "micro-managing''
of the process of telephony. 11 We need this, he says, to get through a
transition period. Similarly, Geller applauds the FCC's effort, backed by
the new Act, to "facilitate [conventional television broadcasting's] transition into digital broadcasting," after having noted that there is no
practical need for this oversight. 12 But, it will help with the transition
period.
What is not said is this: Every failed policy that Henry Geller now
laments was once defended as a necessary bit of micro-managing, needed just to get us through a transition period. Most regulations promulgated by most industry-specific regulatory agencies have been defended
that way.
Henry Geller, an astute and intimate observer of telecommunications
regulation for several decades, knows these things. And he knows, further, that every one of these regulations takes on a permanent life of its
own as it generates a constituency that makes money from the regulation and therefore needs to be placated, before the agency and in the
Congress, before the regulation can be altered.
And so it will become with the "micro-managing" of the ''transitions" from monopoly to competition in wired local exchange service
and from analog to digital, high definition television. One does not
need a Ph.D. in prophesy to foretell the futures of these rules. Each
will spawn an industry dependent for its livelihood on the rule's retention. These rules will stymie efficient innovation, deter entry, and confer greater wealth on the already wealthy.
Henry Geller, ten years from now, will observe these things and
explain that he does not favor the rules. But, he will note, we could
use some FCC micro-managing-while Congress cheers in the background--of these new problems that have just emerged in, say, Internet
regulation and in competition among fixed microwave service providers.
There is no limit to my admiration for Henry Geller's grasp of the
history of telecommunications regulation. I remain puzzled, however, by

sion, but with much reduced powers.
11. Heruy Geller, The 1996 Telecom Act: Cutting the Compel/th-e Gordian Knot, 29 CONN.
L. REv. 205, 207 (1996}.
12. /d. at 211.

380

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:373

the lessons he draws from the history he knows so well. I guess I
learned the old aphorism backwards. I thought it taught that people
who do not read history are doomed to repeat it.
Levi

Professor Levi on paper is like Professor Levi in person: a very
sharp-but at the same time gentle-lawyer with a distaste for extreme
solutions. One can only salute a paper that reflects such qualities. But,
in my judgment, the sensible middle course she suggests has already
been tried and found wanting.
My paper said some pretty contemptuous things about the licensing
process and especially the comparative licensing process. The paper left
unsaid, as Professor Levi figures out, even more contemptuous things.
Professor Levi does two things that I think are very valuable and
inarguably so. First, she insists that the licensing process be given a
more scholarly and more respectful burial. Her analysis of the history
of broadcast licensing controls is a model of accuracy and clarity. Second, excellent communications law scholar that she is, Professor Lev
notes something I did not-and wish I had: The new Act can be read
to open the door to the FCC promulgating many broadcast censorship
rules that it will then enforce in the licensing process with more "bite"
than any we have seen to date. Further, indications to date are that this
is precisely the way the present FCC chair will read these provisions of
the Act.
With Professor Levi, I agree that this latter course is a bad idea.
With Professor Powe, I wrote a whole book about that idea 13 and hope
that Professor Levi's comment may boost its sales. If my response to
Professor Becker is one of abrupt passion, Professor Levi's equally
stringent critique of his argument is more one of measured reason.
I part company with Professor Levi when she suggests that the
FCC not "abdicate any licensing oversight in favor of rubber-stamping
renewals without searching review of compliance with the Act and the
FCC rules." 14 Government has no authority to condition continuance of
the privilege to publish upon some governmental review of its past
performance. That is the lesson-a lesson worth heeding-not only of

13. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 3.
14. Lili Levi, Not With a Bang But a Whimper: Broadcast License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 287 (1996).
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the more modem Pentagon Papers case, 15 but also of the seminal case
of Near v. Minnesota. 16
My objection to Professor Levi's admonition to the Commission,
however, is not only constitutionally grounded. Her protestations notwithstanding, I believe her suggestions are remarkably similar to-indeed, virtually identical to-the manner in which the D.C. Circuit, in
the Citizens Communication Center case, 17 suggested the FCC should
operate its licensing processes. Even the D.C. Circuit is no longer of
that view, as Professor Levi herself explains, and I think she should
abandon it, too, for the same reasons.
Let's agree that broadcasters have a duty to serve the public. Can
we not also agree that this duty should be enforced by listeners and
viewers turning the control knobs on their sets? Isn't this a better process than suspending the rule against prior restraints so that a small
group of Platonic Guardians of the Airwaves can determine for us what
we are fit to hear and see?
Robinson

My responses to Professor Robinson are, perhaps regrettably, more
of the nit-picking variety. This is because, as any reader of both our
pieces must realize, he and I appear to approach these issues in largely
the same way. Thus, for the most part, all I can do is to commend his
trenchant analysis-while lamenting that I did not say it as well as he.
Some examples of Professor Robinson's particularly well taken points
include, in my judgment, his discussions of the removal of group ownership limits for radio stations; 18 his very well illustrated point that efficient use of the spectrum does not require auctions, but rather the "development of flexible and tradable property rights in spectrum use"; 19
his pithy summary and damning critique of the 1992 Cable Act;20 his

15. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
16. 283 U.S. 697 {1931). As Professor Powe and I show in RE.GUJ.AltNG BROADCAST PROGRAM·
MING, supra note 3, at 180-84 had the courts merely applied Near to the activities of the Federal Radio Commission, we could have avoided a whole lot of mischief, not to mention some
very bad constitutional, administrative, and broadcasting law. I am sorry that Professor Levi
does not discuss how her proposals would square with the doctrine against prior restmlnL
17. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F. 2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
18. Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L
REv. 289, 292-95 (1996).
19. /d. at 297.
20. /d. at 299-304.
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succinct treatment of the V-chip issues;21 and his lengthy and carefully
balanced analysis of "the cyberpom problem."22
So where do we differ? Largely, I think, in some of his understandings of some of my positions. These misunderstandings may lead
to a false sense of conflict or may mask real differences. I highlight
here two such interpretive differences.
First, with respect to spectrum allocation and the assignment of
additional stations to existing television licensees, the points I meant to
convey were these. (1) We ought to allocate the spectrum efficiently,
which means giving it to its highest valued use. (2) Providing an extra
channel for each television licensee does not even pretend to accomplish this efficiency goal. (3) The usual rationales for substituting some
non-efficient outcomes are that we need to expand the number of licensees, or to increase female or minority ownership of broadcast stations, or to expand the number of outlets to expand the number of
networks. (4) Perversely, the new Act's determination that each licensee
shall get another channel not only does not serve the efficiency goal,
but it also retards achievement of the non-efficiency goals listed in
point (3). To Professor Robinson's complaints that my objections are
based on inconsistent criteria23 and that I fail to raise "the appropriate
question,"24 then, I plead not guilty. Perhaps a charge of negligent
draftsmanship on my part might, I confess, hold up in court.
Second, I think his analysis of the new Act's provisions respecting
interconnection to local exchange carriers-or, perhaps more precisely,
Professor Robinson's introduction to that analysis25-misapprehends my
reservations. My hesitation to join the loud cheerleading over these
provisions-as well as those freeing telephone companies to offer cable
television services-stems from the simple fact that I suspect that the
electronic transmission of encoded audio, video, or other data to the
home via wire is a natural monopoly. If that suspicion is correct, then,
the way to increase competition with firms laying wire to the home is
to increase the competitiveness of non-wire carriers. I am not against
efforts to facilitate wire facilities-based competition, but I am more
strongly for stimulating competition from cellular telephony, personal
communications services, multi-point distribution television and direct

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

!d.
!d.
!d.
Id.
!d.

at
at
at
at
at

309-310.
310-316.
293-94.
294.
304-05.
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satellite broadcasting. I am not, as Professor Robinson puts it, "only
lukewarm on what most observers, around the world, regard as one of
the stunning achievements of modem public policy."26 Rather, I just do
not agree that letting telephone companies offer cable television services
is such an achievement, while I do believe that creating a commercial
mobile radio service and a direct broadcasting satellite service and a
true open pipeline common carrier Internet configuration are such stunning achievements.
To return to the positive side, I especially enjoyed Professor
Robinson's concluding discussions. His lengthy analysis of the universal
service issue27 provides a nice contrast to that of Professor Campbell.
The two really ought to be read together. I remain content with my
conclusion that, whatever we ought to do about universal service, doing
it with internal cross-subsidies is not wise.
Finally, some of his more intriguing observations occur in Professor
Robinson's ruminations that he labels "Regulation and Entitlement in
the Information Age."28 Here he provides, inadvertently, his own responses to Henry Geller, similar to those I just offered. In a book I
entitled Telecommunications Law and Policy, I asked whether supporters of the antitrust consent decree that broke up the Bell System ought
to proclaim their approval of the decree by chanting, "The New Deal is
dead; long live the New Deal."29 My students usually think this is a
joke. Professor Robinson knows it is not. He knows-and has illustrated in a most interesting fashion-that it has become standard operating
procedure to accompany telecommunications "deregulation" with extensive regulatory oversight, detailed oversight that is conduct specific and
outcome specific. He also knows that these regulations, to date, in most
cases have increased the costs of doing business to existing firms and
raised entry barriers to new ones-retarding rather than enhancing competition. He knows that today's regulation is often tomorrow's entitlement. These are reasons why we should look skeptically at those provisions of the new Act that call for regulatory intervention so massive
that the Chair of the FCC can compare the agency's task with the
Manhattan Project.
For these reasons, I am puzzled that Professor Robinson suggests

26.
27.
28.
29.

/d. at 304.
/d. at 320-28.
/d. at 316.
THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELEcoMMUNICATIONS LAW & POUCY, 514 (1994).
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he is more enthusiastic than I about the new Act. 30 What source of
enthusiasm has he discovered that I overlooked? Professor Robinson
further complains that I have not been sufficiently clear in my conclusions.31 Let me try again. Drawing frequently on many lessons that
Professor Robinson has taught us, I believe that the new Act is good
insofar as it reduces entry barriers and "bad" or "ugly" insofar as it
does not. Further, I take comfort in the assurance that the Act can do
no lasting hann to my grandchild32 because in the long run telecommunications technology will overwhelm any barriers that Congress and
the FCC try to impose.

Rosario & Kohler
I admire this article very much. My admiration does not, I hope,
stem from the fact that the authors offer almost no quarrel with my
analyses and criticisms of the 1996 Act.
Instead, the authors helpfully focus on the changes in state telecommunications regulation dictated by the new federal Act. To revert to
my previous grading system, I would rate some of these changes as
"good"-such as the prohibition on states erecting entry barriers not
justified by compelling health and safety concems.33 I think some are
"bad"-such as the Act's failure to provide a well defined path for
judicial review of state commission interconnection decisions. 34 Others I
judge to be just plain "ugly"-such as the conclusion that, although
cable rate regulation is still in order, it is not in order for systems with
less than 50,000 subscribers, for that reason alone. 35
I think the authors agree with the grades I give to each of these
specific examples. More importantly, I know that they have provided a
very valuable catalog of the key issues of state law that the 1996 Act
spawned.
Nevertheless, I remain a bit unsatisfied. The authors explain what
state functions or policies the new Act threatens, but do not help us to
evaluate these threats. What are the proper roles of state regulators in

30. Robinson, supra note 18, at 304, 328.
31. Robinson, supra note 18, at 293-94, 304.
32. Hi, Lance!
33. Discussed by Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, The Telecommunications Act of 1996:
A State Perspective, 29 CONN. L. REv. 331, 333 (1996).
34. !d. at 336-37 and n.24.
35. /d. at 344-45.

1996]

RESPONSES

385

telecommunications markets today?
This is a very hard question. It raises issues not only about the
proper distribution of authority between market and regulatory mechanisms but also about allocating power vertically, between the states and
the national government. One reason the vertical issue (as I will call it)
is difficult is that it is hard to imagine why state lines should play any
role in delineating the bounds of regulatory authority over telecommunications. Telecommunication is, after all, a product designed to transcend
geopolitical boundaries and to knit together people widely scattered; we
praise telecommunication for having these attributes. Offhand, I cannot
think of a major telecommunications firm that does business solely
within one state. When AT&T's local exchange business was spun off,
the Bell Operating Companies were organized along regional, not state,
lines. Indeed, given the technology and its achievements, one might say
that the real issue should not be what authority the states possess, but
rather why telecommunications regulation is not conducted principally
at the international level.
Yet, the case for regulation below the federal (or international)
level remains strong. Local regulatory agencies might, while competing
among themselves, introduce and test novel regulatory standards and
processes. We might all learn from observing these experiments. Consumers may benefit from more accessible regulators. For some issues--e.g., environmental standards to control siting of telecommunications facilities36-varying local rules seem to make sense. In other areas--control over Internet access and local distance phone rates come
to mind-localism seems perverse.
Rosario and Kohler, then, in my estimation, have not only provided
an excellent catalog of the state law issues emanating from the Telecommunications Act of 1996. They have also, by their carefully researched example, shown just how badly we need some theory or set
of standards by which to judge the vertical distribution of regulatory
power over telecommunications.

Spitzer
Professor Spitzer beautifully tells a fascinating and coherent story.
What are we to make of it?
Professor Spitzer is correct that the portions of the Telecommunica-

36. !d. at 350.
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tions Act of 1996 that deal with broadcasting can quite easily be understood as the reaffinnation of a political economy deal between Congress and broadcasters that was first struck in 1927. Indeed, Professor
Spitzer quite rightly points out that this is what gets my goat. It is
downright intolerable that we should allow the major medium of expression in this country to make a deal whereby for some free (or discounted) inputs and protection from entry barriers, the medium's owners agree to avoid controversy and to serve up only mediocre fare. One
is hard-pressed to decide who is more blameworthy-Congress, for
surrendering its responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, or broadcasters, for giving away freedoms they could enjoy in no other country in
the world.
Perhaps in part because he is a long time student of this area of
law, 37 Professor Spitzer understands the realities and possibilities of
broadcast programming, and the federal regulation of broadcast programming, far better than Professor Becker. Yet, does Professor Spitzer
really know what he's talking about?
We have a fairly complete historical record of the politics of the
1920s and a pretty detached vantage point from which to observe that
record. Accordingly, I think we can be quite confident that the "original deal" that Professor Hazlett described, and which Professor Spitzer
here recounts, really did happen. This might come as a surprise to the
Supreme Court, which is fond of describing broadcast regulation as
born out of the chaos that occurred when unregulated stations interfered
with each other.38 By now, however, I think everyone except the
Supremes knows the truth: Congress, or at least the key people there
who controlled the agenda on the issue of broadcast regulation, realized
that "interference was not the issue, interference was the opportunity."39
They and the broadcasters made a deal and the Federal Radio Commission and later the FCC carried it out.
That is, however, only historical interpretation. How do we know
what is moving us today? If this political economy thing is so good,
why can't it predict anything? Compare Professor Spitzer with Professor Levi. He says the new Act renewed an old deal; she says the new
Act made possible a new deal. Aren't these conflicting claims equally

37. So there is, after all, some value to knowing the details before working on the megatheory.
38. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); NBC v. United Stntes,
319 u.s. 190 (1943).
39. REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING, supra note 3, at 18 (quoting Professor Hazlett).
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plausible?
Let me try to express my discomfort with Professor Spitzer's political economy another way. Suppose Congress had not added the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to the new Act, but rather had repealed every statutory provision that suggested-or even hinted-that
the federal government had any powers to regulate "indecent" telecommunications. Could not Professor Spitzer also-and with equal plausibility-claim that this was a renewal of the old deal, cast in new
form because of changed circumstances?
Professor Spitzer could tell us, perhaps, that given the incredible
plethora of broadcast stations, licensees now find it much more valuable
to compete for niche audiences. To do so, many of them need to cuss
and show pictures of naked women. Meanwhile, Congresspersons
watched Bob Dole rescue a campaign from the brink of bankruptcy by
going to Hollywood and shrieking at a few television executives for
making him watch shows he doesn't like. So, Congress "renewed the
original deal" by giving broadcasters a pile of money, while the broadcasters gave Congress back a valuable political gift, a whipping boy.
If one can tell the story of the new Act and the story of its mirror
image equally well in terms of a renewal of the original deal, what is
the point of the storytelling? Candor, as well as my affection for Matt
Spitzer, requires me to say that I do what he does all the time. Unable
to find a coherent public interest rationale for the Act of 1927, 1934,
or 1996 (not to mention the all time worst, the 1992 Cable Act), I find
helpful the tools of political economy in searching for an explanation
as to why these things happened. But I also have to remind myself--and am here (perhaps gratuitously) reminding Professor
Spitzer-that the real job is to try to figure out what ought to be done
(or perhaps more plausibly what ought not to be done) and how to
bring it about

Hazle//
Through no fault of Professor Hazlett or the editors of this issue, I
received my copy of his commentary after I had already written my
responses to the other comments. At this point the only fair (or the
least unfair) thing to do is to take up his points here, even though I
depart from the alphabetical ordering promised at the outset.
Much of Professor Hazlett's paper is an excellent review of the
political dynamics, or the political economy, of the new Act. His and
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Professor Spitzer's papers thus reenforce each other. Together they
provide an excellent overview of the regulatory process as an exercise
in bargaining over values to a (temporary) equilibrium point. My response to Professor Spitzer's comment reveals, I hope, both my admiration for this kind of work and my sense of its limitations.
Perhaps I should add, in light of Professor Hazlett's portrayal of
the system, that the technology and the rules-what I call "convergence" and "legal balkanization"-did play central roles in this. It is
only because the microprocessor made computers, telephones, televisions and radios indistinguishable-and made wireless cable and broadcast satellites possible-that the regulatory equilibrium of the 1970s
came unstuck. Further, it was only because that previous equilibrium
was dominated by legal balkanization (or, as Professor Hazlett prefers,
regulatory apartheid) that a mammoth new Act had to be written-rather than, for example, just appointing some commissioners with
new ideas to the FCC.
Although I enjoyed all of Professor Hazlett's commentary, I want
to single out two parts for special praise. First, I admire his discussion
of the difference (which I missed) between the FCC's video dialtone
("VDT") rules, which the new Act repealed, and the Open Video System ("OVS") alternative, established in the new Act. I had noted only
that the VDT and OVS rules are substantively quite similar. Professor
Hazlett importantly notes that the processes employed in implementing
the tw,..;> concepts are very different-the VDT rules virtually begged
competitors to use the FCC's regulatory processes to retard entry, while
the OVS rules do not give a similar opportunity to disgruntled competitors.40 Hazlett's remarks remind us, more generally, that the processes
of regulation, fully as much as the content of the rules, have direct
bearings on the structure and behavior of the regulated industry. He
makes the truly important point that genuine "deregulation" might focus
as much on how the agency implements its rules as on the rules themselves. I wish I had said that.
A second aspect of Professor Hazlett's paper which I especially
admire is that he took better care than I to identify all the winners and
all the losers in this latest legislative attempt to make communications
law relevant to the previous ten minutes of world history. In particular,
I noted as he counted up the victims and winners that the victims were

40. Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L. REV. 217, 231-32 (1996).
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by and large those who move data by wire (cable operators, local exchange carriers), while the winners-that is, those untouched by the
frenzy of reregulation that fonns the core of the new Act-are largely
those who move data by air (terrestrial broadcasters, commercial mobile
radio services, satellite broadcasters, personal communications services).
Not only are most of the latter incorrigible federal welfare recipients,41
who get their key input-spectrum use-for free, but most of them got
a free ride (or something close to a free ride) through this reregulation
Act I am not sure why this is so.
Finally, I must address Professor Hazlett's attempt to come to grips
with the question I raised at the end of my article: What is the appropriate role for the FCC? He concludes that we need a regulator without
discretion and thinks such a person might be a judge. I admire his bold
and imaginative effort to take seriously the question I posed, but I
cannot applaud the result he reaches.
In my judgment, many of the failures of the 1996 Act, both mistakes of commission and those of omission, stem from a deeper failure,
a failure to ask why we have a Federal Communications Commission
and what it might reasonably be expected to accomplish. Professor
Hazlett agrees with this point, I believe, and he helpfully points to two
functions-spectrum allocation and oversight of the conditions of network interconnection-that are enduring issues of telecommunications
policy and for which a federal regulatory authority might be a wise
solution.
But to suggest that this authority be a judge without discretion? Not
a good idea. One is tempted simply to ask whether Professor Hazlett
reads his own stuff. A regulator without discretion? How could anyone
who has any official governmental authority to order or control behavior in telecommunications markets not possess discretion? How could
the political economy of regulation ever produce such a character?
If such a thing might be produced, it could not be a judge. Judges
are people. People have souls. People with souls have discretion because they have their own senses of right and wrong. No judge has
ever said, "I do not like this result. I think it is bad for society and the
parties to this case. Nevertheless, I am going to reach this conclusion
because I lack discretion to do otherwise." No judge will ever say that,

41. Imagine what would happen if some legislator proposed lhat lhe new federal approach to
welfare be applied to broadcasters, so lhat lhey had to get off lhe dolc-lhat is, stop using lhe
spectrum wilhout paying for it-wilhin five years.
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even one selected by Professor Hazlett.42
It is almost quaint to imagine that one could solve the issues of
spectrum allocation and network interconnection by handing them to a
judge who lacks discretion. The suggestion, I think, speaks volumes,
not about telecommunications law, but about non-lawyers' perceptions
of the legal and judicial process. But, in this case, even the non-lawyers should know better. As Professor Hazlett himself notes, one effect
of the new Act was to take some important aspects of telecommunications regulation away from a federal district court judge because no one
was comfortable with such a system.
To put my criticisms in a more polite form and a more charitable
light, Professor Hazlett does not mention that we will need to give this
hypothetical judge without discretion some rules to follow. Given his
description of the legislative process that yielded the Telecommunications Act of 1996, how does Professor Hazlett imagine that wise
rules-and rules that leave no discretion to the judge who implements
them-can be legislated for two of the most important and most enduring problems of telecommunications regulation: spectrum allocation
and network interconnection't3

42. Just as Professor Becker imagines a well functioning regulatory environment that controls
program content because he assumes people like him will manage it, so Professor Hazlett can
advocate what he regards as a tolerable system of regulation because, in his imagination, he
can also invent a new species to administer it
43. If there is a judicial model out there that will work, it is probably the model of antitrust law. Antitrust judges have done a remarkably good job of fashioning legal rules to protect
competitive markets and restrict anti-competitive practices. The judges do not, however, perform
this work without exercising discretion; nor do they necessarily do a better job than regulatory
commissions. I think we will do better to chew on these kinds of issues than to search for a
judge without discretion.

